Abstract. This paper will discuss the Logjam attack on TLS. The Logjam attack allows, under certain conditions, to defeat the security provided by TLS. This is done by manipulating server and client into using weak and deprecated export grade crypto, and subsequently breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We explore how the attack works conceptually and how exactly TLS is vulnerable to this attack. Also, the conditions under which the attack can be mounted are discussed, and an estimate of the impact of the attack is presented. Lastly, several mitigations are presented.
Introduction
In recent days, awareness about the security of communications is on the rise. More and more websites provide secure connections to protect visitors from Manin-the-Middle attacks that might compromise confidentiality and/or integrity of the communication. Initiatives like Let's Encrypt [8] further facilitate the transition towards encrypted communication.
TLS is a cryptographic protocol that facilitates setting up and using secure communication channels, supporting several authentication methods and different cryptographic suites. TLS is well known for its use in HTTPS, but also IMAP, SMTP and many other protocols rely on TLS. As such, the security of TLS is very important. In the past, various vulnerabilities in the TLS protocol or in its implementations were found, such as the Lucky 13 [2] and FREAK [10] [5] attacks.
In this paper, we discuss the Logjam attack, that targets the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In Section 2 we will discuss Diffie-Hellman, and briefly cover how it can be attacked. The parts of the TLS protocol that are relevant are discussed in Section 3, while the actual Logjam attack is explained in Section 4. Different countermeasures are presented in Section 5, and the main points of this paper are summarized in the conclusion in Section 6.
The Logjam attack is applicable against TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2. In this paper, when the term TLS is used, version 1.2 is meant except if stated otherwise.
Breaking Diffie Hellman
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange [7] is a cryptographic algorithm that is used in order to securely generate a shared secret between two communicating parties.
This key can then be used as a symmetric key in order to allow the parties to communicate securely.
Alice
Bob
After running the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, Alice and Bob have obtained shared secret s = g
ab . An attacker that intercepts their communication will have the values of g a and g b , but will be unable to obtain the shared secret g ab . In order to obtain this, the attacker will have to compute a discrete logarithm to either obtain the secret exponent a or b. The security of the DiffieHellman protocol resides in the fact that solving the discrete log problem is computationally hard.
Solving the Discrete Log problem for large groups p is efficiently done using the number field sieve algorithm [13] . Other algorithms exist that can solve the discrete log problem faster, such as the one presented by Barbulescu et al. [4] , but these algorithms have additional constraints 1 , rendering them unsuitable for attacking real-world Diffie-Hellman key exchanges.
The Number Field Sieve algorithm consists of four steps. We will not discuss the algorithm in detail, but will present a short overview of the steps, as this is relevant for understanding the Logjam attack. More details about the number field sieve algorithm can easily be found online, a great introduction is presented in A Tale of Two Sieves [12] by Pomerance.
The first step is Polynomial selection, which takes a relatively short time and is easily parallelized, but is important as it has great influence on the running time of the second step [3] , which is the sieving step. During the sieving, ranges of field elements are factored in order to find elements that are B-smooth 2 . Sieving also parallelizes well. The third step is linear algebra. A large matrix is built, consisting of the coefficient vectors found in the previous step. This step can, to some extent, also be parallelized. The fourth and final step is the descent. In this step, the output of the previous step is used to compute the discrete log for a given a, g.
TLS
Before we discuss how Logjam uses the number field sieve algorithm in order to attack TLS, we first discuss in some detail how the relevant part of TLS works 3 . When a client connects to a server through TLS, he sends a ClientHello message. The format of the message is as follows, as specified 4 in RFC 5246 [6] : Note that the ServerKeyExchange contains signed Diffie-Hellman parameters, but does not contain the actual cipher suite that was chosen by the server. This is relevant for the Logjam attack, as explained in the next section. The server ends the Hello phase by sending a ServerHelloDone message. The client has now received the server's Diffie-Hellman parameters, namely the modulus p, generator g and the server's Diffie-Hellman public value Y s , and responds to the server by sending a ClientKeyExchange message, containing the client's Diffie-Hellman public value Y c . The client now sends the Finished message, securely encrypted with the negotiated cipher and key. The server responds by also sending a Finished message, finalizing the handshake.
Clients may use the so-called False Start [9] . This allows the client send an encrypted data packet before it received the Finished message from the server, in order to reduce the latency caused by the TLS handshake protocol.
Logjam
Logjam [1] is an attack on TLS, that makes use of a protocol flaw in TLS in conjunction with support for obsolete and insecure protocols. The attack works as follows:
Target selection
In order to be vulnerable for the Logjam attack, there are some properties that must hold for the server configuration. The server should either support an export-grade cipher suite, or support DHE with a small prime. Export-grade ciphers are ciphers that were intentionally weakened in the 1990s in order to comply with US export laws on cryptographic technology.
The authors of the original research paper demonstrated that attacking 512-bit primes is very possible with today's technology, while the precomputation for 768-bit primes should be feasible for academic research teams. According to Adrian et al., it is possible that nation-state level opponents could break a small number of 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman groups, although the precomputation would still take a very long time. They argue that this is possibly already the case, based on evidence of the NSA's VPN decryption infrastructure that were leaked by Edward Snowden [14] .
An important issue is that some primes are used by many different servers. This allows an attacker to do the precomputation once, and use the log db in order to attack many different servers. While computation for 512-bits primes is not extremely expensive, this definitely increases the plausibility of attacks against 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman groups, as this would only be sufficiently rewarding if more than a single target server can be attacked using the log db. According to Adrian et al., at the time they published their research paper, 8.4% of the top million websites are vulnerable for the Logjam attack as they support the use of 512-bit groups. An attacker who is able to compute a log db for the single most used 1024-bit group is able to attack 37.1% of the one million most popular websites.
Precomputation of log db
Once the prime p that is used by the targeted server(s) is known, the attacker proceeds to perform a precomputation. This largely follows the steps outlined in Section 2, but the precomputation only involves the first three steps. The reason is that the first three stages of the algorithm are solely based on the prime p. If we want to compute a from y = g a mod p, we only need to use the values of y and g in the descent stage. Logjam exploits this by precomputing the first three steps for a desired prime p, and storing the intermediate result in a log db. When attempting to compute a discrete log in the field Z p , the log db is used as input for the descent phase.
Computing a log db takes a long time. However, it is important to know that, while the Logjam attack focuses on downgrading a TLS connection to export grade crypto (as explained in the next step), a nation-state level attacker could possibly attack servers that only support regular, 1024-bit DHE cipher suites.
Man-in-the-Middle of a connection
When the attacker has built a log db for a given prime, he can abuse a Man-inthe-Middle scenario and intercept and decrypt the communication between the client and the server. This works as illustrated in figure 1 .
The ClientHello message is modified by the attacker, removing all cryptographic suites and adding an export-grade suite that is supported by the server. The server trivially accepts to use this suite, as it is the only suite they both 'support'. The ServerHello message that is sent to the client is now modified, the DHE EXPORT cipher choice is replaced by regular DHE as not to arouse suspicion and to not depend on DHE EXPORT support on the client side. When the server sends his signed ServerKeyExchange message, this discrepancy between cipher suite choices between client and server is not a problem, as the DHE parameters have the same format. The server also sent his Diffie-Hellman Fig. 1 . Message Sequence Chart of the Logjam attack. Source: [1] public value g b , and the attacker starts to solve the discrete log problem using the log db, in order to uncover b. The client will send his public value, and send the Finished message. As soon as the attacker found the value b, the attacker sends the message and herewith completes the TLS handshake. He is now able to decrypt any encrypted traffic between client and server, and can also modify and re-encrypt data.
If the client uses False Start, he might send a first encrypted data packet before receiving the server's Finished message. In that case, the attacker may decrypt the packet at any time when the discrete log has been found. Even with the log db, finding b is computationally hard, but there are tricks to hide or increase the time-frame required by the attacker in order to be able to send a valid Finished message. The client's browser will timeout if the server does not send any new TLS message within a certain time-frame. However, the attacker can send a TLS warning alert which, besides resetting the timeout, is ignored by the client. The attacker could open a TLS session to a server the client is expected to connect to by injecting an invisible element from the target server in an unencrypted webpage that is also visited by the client, and solve the discrete log with little time pressure. This connection can then be kept alive, in order to avoid suspicion due to a long wait when the client visits the target server.
Countermeasures
Logjam relies on several server and client settings, and different possibilities exist to limit or fully mitigate the risks of the Logjam attack. In this section, we discuss several safeguards that may be implemented by the server and/or by the client.
Server-side countermeasures
-Randomization of the parameter p. Although generating a prime p that is safe to use 6 is computationally expensive, it should be possible to let the server generate one upon installation. In that case, there is less reward for an attacker to do the precomputation for any prime p, as it will allow him to attack only a single server. Additionally, the prime could be regenerated periodically, in order to further limit the potential gain for an attacker.
-Disable support for export-grade cipher suites. Export grade cipher suites use small, 512-bits primes, and as such must be considered unsafe. The server should not be using primes shorter than 2048 bits. -Use ECDHE instead of DHE. ECDHE is a variant of Diffie-Hellman which operates in an elliptic curve instead of a finite field. The advantage here is that discrete log algorithms for elliptic curves do not benefit as much from precomputation, raising the bar for an attacker.
Client-side countermeasures
-Require long primes p. Currently, 2048 bits primes are considered secure, while 1024 bits primes may be compromised when considering nation-state level opponents. Note that the client should actually check if p > 2 1024 as a 1024 bits prime can simply be padded with zeroes in order to be accepted as a 2048 bits.
-Reduce TLS handshake timeout. This provides the attacker with a shorter time window in which he must solve the DL, increasing the difficulty of the attack. Also, the timeout should be separate from the current timer, in order to ensure that it cannot be reset by the attacker using TLS warning alert messages. -Be careful with TLS False Start. Even when using shorter timeouts (as discussed before), the data that is transmitted before the handshake completes can be decrypted by an attacker as soon as he solved the discrete log for this session and obtains the shared secret.
Conclusion
It is expected that TLS 1.3 will mitigate the Logjam attack by adding a field to the ServerKeyExchange message, that contains the cipher suite chosen by the server. This field should, like the Diffie-Hellman parameters, be protected against tampering by a signature. This solves the vulnerability, as an attacker can no longer trick the client into believing a strong cipher suite was chosen, while the server chose a deprecated and insecure cipher suite. TLS 1.2, however, can be expected to remain supported for a long time, and until support is phased out the Logjam attack remains a serious threat. Precautions must be taken in order to limit the risks of abuse, and different countermeasures exist. In the opinion of the author, a solution that is in most cases relatively easy to implement would be to either adopt strong, 2048-bit primes, or to diversify 1024-bit primes by (preferably periodically) generating them on the server. This would either make precomputation infeasible or at least drastically decrease the advantage of precomputation, as the resulting log db could only be used against a single server. Other solutions, like transitioning away from DHE towards ECDHE, are possibly more secure, but require larger changes to existing infrastructure, as not all software supports the stronger ECDHE cipher suite families.
